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Richard D. Marsico"
L Introduction
The traditional government social welfare programs aimed at
poverty may alleviate some of poverty's harshest consequences for
needy individuals, but they are not designed to eliminate poverty.,
On the other hand, two unique federal statutes, the Community
Reinvestment Act ("CRA")2 and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
("HMDA"), 3 provide opportunities to eliminate poverty through
community empowerment and economic development.
Professor of Law, New York Law School. The author thanks Steve Bachmann,
Jean Marie Brescia, Carol Buckler, Keri Gould, Larry Grosberg, Michael Perlin, and
Tony Taibi for their comments on earlier drafts, and Michele Cotton for her insightful
and careful editing.
'See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Fire This Time, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1579
(1993) (noting that most government programs are aimed at the symptoms of poverty and
are not cures for it).
2 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (1994).
3 i2 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1994).
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Community groups have used the CRA and HMDA to force
banks into loaning billions of dollars to low-income neighborhoods.4
However, due to, several factors, including underenforcement of the
laws,' their own internal limitations, and the dependency they foster
on outside institutions, the full potential of the CRA and HMDA
poverty-fighting tools has not been realized.
Increasingly, however, community groups have been
employing a strategy with more potential. They have been using the
CRA and HMDA to support and create community development
financial institutions ("CDFIs"), which are community-controlled
financial intermediaries explicitly designed to eliminate poverty and
meet community credit needs.6 Using the CRA and HMDA to
support CDFIs promises to fight poverty more-effectively. CDFIs
bypass the underenforcement and internal limitations of the CRA and
HMDA. They also help to develop, low-income communities'
economic infrastructure and reduce dependency on outside
institutions.'
4 See Maron A. Cowell, Jr. & Monty D. Hagler, The Community Reinvestment Act
in the Decade of Bank Consolidation, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 83, 83 (1992).
5 See, e.g., Robert C. Art, Social Responsibility in Bank Credit Decisions: The
Community Reinvestment Act One Decade Later, 18 PAc. L.J. 1071, 1106-07 (1987)
(characterizing agency enforcement as "low priority"); Allen J. Fishbein, The
Community Reinvestment Act after Fifieen Years: It Works, But Strengthened Federal
Enforcement Is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293, 296 (1993) (identifying the
inadequacies of CRA enforcement); Stephen A. Fuchs, Discriminatory Lending
Practices: Recent Developments, Causes and Solutions, 10 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 461,
479-80 (1991) (noting the lack of enforcement of federal laws by federal agencies and
characterizing the CRA as "a monument to regulatory inaction").
6 See discussion infra part III.A.
7 Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment:
Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1463, 1469 (1994) ("Working-class, ethnic, and minority
communities must control their own destinies by wresting control of local finance away
from non-local institutions; they must not simply ask those institutions to invest a little
more in local neighborhoods.").
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A. Statutory Overview
The CRA requires the federal bank regulatory, agencies' (the
"agencies") to encourage insured depository institutions ("banks") to
meet the credit needs of low- and moderate-income communities. 9 It
requires a bank's federal regulatory agency to periodically assess a
bank's community lending record and to take that record into account
when considering a bank's application to expand its business."0
Community residents can enforce this community lending obligation
by filing a challenge to a bank's application with the bank's
supervisory agency on the grounds that the bank has failed to meet
community credit needs." The regulator can deny the application if
the bank's CRA record is inadequate.
The HMDA requires banks to disclose information about their
home mortgage lending record, including the disposition of home
mortgage applications according to the race, gender, and income of
8 There are four federal banking agencies: the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency ("OCC"), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the
"Federal Reserve"), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), and the
Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"). See 12 U.S.C. § 2902(1) (1994).
' See Statement of the Federal Financial Supervisory Agencies Regarding the
Community Reinvestment Act, 54 Fed. Reg. 13,742, 13,743 (1989); 12 U.S.C. §§
2901(a)-(b), 2903(1) (1994).
10 12 U.S.C. §§ 2902-2903 (1994). Each agency has promulgated nearly identical
substantive CRA regulations. See 12 C.F.R. § 25 (1994) (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 228
(1994) (Federal Reserve); 12 C.F.R. § 345 (1994) (FDIC); and .12 C.F.R. § 563(e)
(1994) (OTS). The agencies have also issued several joint CRA policy statements. See
Community Reinvestment Act Interagency Questions and Answers, 58 Fed. Reg.- 9176
(1993) [hereinafter CRA Q and A]; Uniform Interagency Community Reinvestment Act
Final Guidelines for the Disclosure of Written Evaluations and Revised Assessment
Rating System, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,163 (1990) [hereinafter Uniform Interagency
Guidelines]; Statement of the Federal Financial Supervisory Agencies Regarding,the
Community Reinvestment Act, 54 Fed. Reg. 13,742, 13,743,(1989) [hereinafter CRA
Statement]. Effective July 1, 1997, the regulations and policy statements will be
replaced by new regulations. See 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156:(1995).
," For more about the CRA, see generally GREGORY D. SQUIRES ET AL., FROM
REDLININO TO REINVESTMENT (1992); Art, supra note 5; Richard Marsico, A Guide to
Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J ,165 (1993); Daniel
D. Pearlman & Roger L. Q. Nguyen, The Community Reinvestment Act: 15 Years Later,
21 Hous. L. BULL. 117 (1991); Fred R. Bleakley, How Groups Pressured One Bank To
.Promise More Inner-City Loans, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1992, at 1.
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the applicant and the location of the property. 2 These data are
frequently used to challenge bank expansion applications.
B. Limits of the "Traditional" Approach
to CRA Enforcement
Community groups from low-income communities have
traditionally used the CRA and HMDA to challenge bank merger
applications on the grounds, that the particular bank has not met
community credit needs and then negotiate lending agreements with
the bank. Although this "traditional" approach has resulted in
funneling billions of dollars of loans into low-income communities,
it has several disadvantages as a poverty-fighting strategy. First, the
CRA and HMDA have limits. Neither the CRA nor HMDA establish
loan quotas for low-income neighborhoods or require a bank to meet
all community credit needs, especially those of the neediest residents.
Second, the agencies that enforce the CRA and HMDA have
interpreted them more restrictively than either their language or their
legislative histories indicate is necessary.13 Third, in relying on
banks and other institutions outside the control of low-income
communities, the traditional approach does not do enough to develop
the community's economic infrastructure. Thus, the traditional
approach does not maximize the potential of the CRA and HMDA
as tools to fight poverty.
C. The Potential of Community Development
Financial Institutions
In contrast to the traditional approach, community groups can
use-and increasingly. are using-the CRA and HMDA to promote
community empowerment and economic development, and to fight
poverty on a deeper,. more permanent level. Community groups are
12 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(4) (1994).
1 The federal bank regulatory agencies have adopted a new set of regulations. See
60 Fed. Reg. 22,156 (1995) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 25, 228, 345, and 563e).
The new regulations will become effective on July 1, 1997. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.51.
Although these new regulations are designed to make CRA enforcement more consistent,
predictable, and substantive, it is unclear whether they will result in stricter CRA
enforcement.
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using the CRA and HMDA to create and support CDFIs dedicated to
meeting community credit needs. CDFIs include community-based
loan counseling, programs, community development loan funds,
micro-enterprise loan funds, community development credit unions,
and community development banks.
1 4
Using the CRA and HMDA to create CDFIs has several
advantages. First, the CDFi approach does not require legislative or
regulatory change because the CRA, as presently construed,
encourages banks to assist community efforts to create CDFIs. t s
Second, in August 1994, Congress passed legislation appropriating
$382 million to support CDFIs.' Third, after years of neglecting to
strictly enforce the CRA obligations of foreign-owned and domestic
"wholesale", banks, -the federal banking agencies are putting more
pressure on them to improve their CRA records. 7 Many of these
banks are doing so by making loans to and investments in CDFIs or
similar entities. Fourth, CDFIs are supported by individuals
represeniing a wide spectrum of views. 9 Finally, in helping to
develop a community-baSed economic infrastructure and promoting
community self-determination rather than dependence on banks and
other outside institutions, CDFIsoffer a much more promising means
,4 Rochelle E. Lento, Community Development Banking Strategy for Revitalizing Our
Communities, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 773, 776 (1995).
,1 See infra text accompanying notes 54-56. Although the proposed CRA regulations
might not make overall CRA enforcement more strict, the proposed CRA regulations
would make agency support for bank participation in CDFI activities even more explicit.
See infra text accompanying notes 138-40.
16 The Community Development Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1994, 12
U.S.C. §§ 4701-4718 (1994); Robert M. Garsonn, Industry Wins Big as SenateApproves
Lending Bill, AM.. BANKER, Aug. 11, 1994, at 1.
17 Wholesale banks have few or no branches and generally serve only large corporate
customers and wealthy individuals.
IS See Christine Dugas, Unrest Moves City's Bankers, NEWSDAY, May 6, 1992, at
45; Robert McNatt, Housing Group Bonds with Japan Banks, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., May
11, 1992, at 24; Michael Quint, Housing Plan in New York Taps Banks from Abroad,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1991, at Bi; Paul H. Scheiber, A CRA Guide for Foreign Banks,
AM. BANKER, Feb. 14, 1991, at 14.
19 See Jonathan R. Macey &.Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act:
An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291, 344-47 (1993); Peter SwIre, Safe Harbors
and a Proposal to Ii;prove the Community Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REv. 349, 356-
57, 363 (1993); Taibi, supra note 7; Anthony D. Taibi, Race Consciousness,
Communitarianism, and Banking Regulation, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 1103, 1105 (1992).
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for communities to end poverty than do loans from traditional
banks.2"
Part II of this article will examine both the potential and limits
of using the CRA and HMDA to fight poverty through community
empowerment and economic development. Part III will show how
the CRA and HMDA can be used to support the creation and growth
of CDFIs. Part III will also show how CDFIs, in helping to build a
community economic infrastructure and to promote community
economic development, are more effective than banks'could ever be
in eliminating poverty. 2'
IL The Limits of Using the CRA and
HMDA To Fight Poverty
In passing the CRA and HMDA, Congress hoped to increase
the level of lending in low-income neighborhoods and to strengthen
communities." However, Congress stopped short of mandatory
lending provisions, leaving to the federal banking regulatory agencies
the task of determining how to increase their lending without
imposing lending quotas. The agencies, however, have
20 See Taibi, supra note 7, at 1522 ("In addition, CDFI lending programs encourage
entrepreneurship, self-sufficiency, and creative problem solving-essential qualities for
national and community economic prosperity, and for breaking the cycles of poverty and
welfare dependency.").
21 Three potential critiques of the CDFI approach are that it would allow banks to
forego their obligations to lend directly to the community, that so much money is
necessary to finance the needs of low-income communities that CDFIs cannot possibly
meet the needs without assistance from banks, and that using the CRA and HMDA to
support CDFIs promotes dependency in the same way as direct lending. This article,
however, does not suggest that community groups should stop using the CRA to pressure
banks to make more loans to low-income communities or that ending poverty is the sole
function of the CRA. Rather, it suggests that the CDFI approach promises to be a more
effective way to eliminate poverty than traditional bank lending and should continue to
grow as an important part of community group CRA strategies. Regarding dependency,
CDFIs determine how and where to invest their money and on what terms it will be
loaned. While they may rely for some of their investment capital on banks, CDFIs
maintain control over its* disposition.
2 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801(b), 2901(a)-(b), 2903(1) (1994); CRA Statement at 13,743
(1989).
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underenforced the CRA and HMDA, further undermining their
effectiveness.23
A. Increasing Lending in Low-Income Areas
1. Congressional Intent
It is difficult to determine Congress' intent in passing the
CRA. The CRA is a vague statute which does not proscribe or
prescribe particular behavior, but only requires that regulators exhort
banks to do more lending in low-income areas. There is also an
internal tension in the CRA, which on the one hand seeks to increase
loans in low-income areas but, on the other hand, prohibits the
allocation of credit to particular areas. Nevertheless, it is possible to
identify the goals Congress sought to accomplish through the CRA,
and these goals can provide some guidance as to CRA's enforcement.
Congress passed the CRA and HMDA in light of evidence
that banks had redlined inner city neighborhoods, contributing to their
decay and destabilization. 4 The HMDA's statement of findings states
that "some depository institutions have sometimes contributed to the
decline of certain geographic areas by their failure . . . to . . .
provide adequate home financing to qualified applicants on reasonable
terms and conditions." 25 Congress hoped that passage of the CRA
and HMDA would help eliminate such redlining.2 6
2 See sources cited supra note 5 and accompanying text.
24 H.R. REP. No. 175, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1977); 121 CONG. REc. 25,159,
25,162, 27,622, 34,569, 34,576 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 561, 94th Cong., lst Sess. 12,
20 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 187, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3, 4, 10 (1975). "Redlining"
is refusing to lend, or lending at significantly higher rates, in certain areas due to
inappropriate criteria such as race. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1279 (6th ed.
1990); Michael S. Little, A Citizen's Guide to Attacking Mortgage Discrimination: The
Lack of Judicial Relief, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 323, 325 (1995).
2' 12 U.S.C. § 2801(a) (1994).
26 123 CONG. REC. 17,604 (1977); President's Remarks on Signing Into Law,
Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, 13 WEEKLY COMp. PRES. Doc.
1777 (Oct. 12, 1977).
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Congress hoped that the CRA and HMDA would likewise
help ensure an adequate supply of credit to inner city
neighborhoods.27 The CRA's statement of purpose states that banks
"have a continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet the credit
needs of the local communities in which they are chartered." 28  As
CRA-sponsor Senator Proxmire pointed out, banks are chartered to
meet the convenience and needs of their communities, and
"convenience and needs does not just mean drive-in teller windows
and Christmas Club accounts. It means loans."2 9 The CRA was to
"provide as much incentive as [Congress] could for local investment
in local communities."
30
Congress also hoped that the CRA would strengthen public
economic development efforts. Congress recognized a "vital
interconnection between successful community and housing
development and local private investment activities. "31 Private loans
were a necessary part of public reinvestment efforts32 and essential in
ensuring continued public investment.33 Congress included the CRA
as part of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977 in
order to encourage participation in the Act's federal grant and
insurance programs to help rebuild inner city areas.34
Despite Congress' concern with promoting economic
development through bank loans, there was a limit to how far
Congress was willing to go to use bank loans to achieve this goal.
Congress did not want the CRA and HMDA to compromise the
7 123 CONG. REc. 17,625 (1977); President's Remarks on Signing Into Law,
Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, 13 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc.
1777 (Oct. 12, 1977); H.R. REP. No. 561, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 11 (1975). See Taibi,
supra note 19, at 1114-15 (noting that Congress passed the CRA under a liberal civil
rights model as applied to the banking context which will ensure ihat'banks lend in low-
income communities); Swire, supra note 19, at 366 (noting that. Congress sought to
encourage investment in low and moderate income communities through the CRA).
28 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(3) (1994).
29 123 CONG. REc. 17,630 (1977).
30 i23 CONO. REC. 31,887 (1977).
31 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 634, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1977).
32 Id.; 123 CoiNo. REC. 17,603 (1977).
31 H.R. REP. No. 561, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975).
3 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 634, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1977).
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safety andsoundness of banks." The HMDA's statement of purpose
indicates it is not intended to "encourage unsound lending practices
or the allocation of credit."36 Similarly, the CRA's statement of
purpose indicates that the agencies are simply to "encourage" banks
to meet community credit needs. 7 As a result of this Congressional
concern with safety and soundness, neither the CRA nor the HMDA
establish lending targets for low-income communities or force banks
to make particular types of loans or low-rate loans to individuals from
low-income neighborhoods. 8
2. Agency Approach to Increasing Lending
Congress left to the federal banking regulatory agencies the
task of resolving the CRA's tension between the goals of increasing
lending levels to low-income neighborhoods and avoiding credit
allocation. 9 The agencies' resolution of this tension has resulted in
enforcement policies which have undermined CRA's effectiveness.
40
35 But see Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 295, 321-24 (noting that the CRA by
its very nature impairs safety and soundness).
36 12 U.S.C. § 2801(c) (1994). But see Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 309
(arguing that CRA necessarily allocates credit by directing it to lower-value uses).
".12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1994).
3 Cowell & Hagler, supra note 4, at 86 (noting that the CRA has "no specific
mandates about how to accomplish satisfactory credit policies" and that it only
"encourages" banks to meet the credit needs of their local communities); Peter D.
Schellie, Current Developments with the Community Reinvestment Act, 42 Bus. LAW.
943, 950 (1987) (recognizing the Federal Reserve Board's interpretation that "the CRA
[does not] dictate a bank's product mix or the proportion of funds designated for
particular borrowers").
, See Art, supra hote 5, at 1073-74 (noting that Congress "carefully avoided rigid
government credit allocation" by imposing a requirement of "good-faith efforts to
improve lending practices" in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods). r
0 See SQuIREs, supra note 11, at 251-57 (arguing that some agencies "actually
encouraged the disinvestment and redlining of inner-city and minority communities and
encouraged speculative investments in white areas"); Fishbein, supra note 5, at 293,
296, 308; Taibi, supra note 19, at 1115; H. Jane Lehman, Bank Loan Regulators Get
a "D" Grade; Senate 'Subcommittee Says Agencies Fail on "Redlining" Tests, WASH.
POST, Feb. 6, 1993, at F2. There is some evidence that the regulators are beginning to
establish stricter standards for CRA compliance. Marsico, supra note 11, at 200-55
(describing enforcement standards and signs that the Federal Reserve, at least, is
tightening its standards); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 301-02 (noting that
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In effect, the federal banking regulatory agencies have
"underenforced" the CRA, resulting in less lending to low-income
areas than there otherwise might have been.4
Under the current CRA regulations, the federal banking
agencies are more concerned with the "process" by which a bank
seeks lending opportunities than its actual lending record.4 2 Under
the current CRA regulations, the agencies tend to view the CRA and
HMDA as "market corrective" devices intended only to ensure that
bankers have adequate information about lending opportunities in
low-income neighborhoods.43 The agencies assume that when banks
learn about creditworthy individuals and projects in inner city areas,
they will make loans to them." This elevation of process over results
agencies began to enforce the CRA more strictly after 1989). It is too early to tell
whether the new CRA regulations will result in stricter enforcement.
"' See Cowell & Hagler, supra note 4, at 92 (stating that regulatory agencies failed
to require financial institutions to prove compliance with the CRA when they considered
protested applications).
42 JEFFREY MARSHALL, STAYING AHEAD OF CRA 188,191 (1992); Macey & Miller,
supra note 19, at 330-33; Lehman, supra note 40; Fed's CRA Ratings Show High Level
of Compliance among 108 Banks Examined, 6 FAIR HOUSING-FAIR LENDING, 6.4
(Dec. 1, 1990); CRA Slowing More Acquisitions, BANK MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
NEWSLETTER, Vol. 7, No. 12, Oct. 1992, at 4; Marsico, supra note 11, at 195-200. In
a recent addition to the CRA Q and A, the agencies take the position that the most
important factors in evaluating a bank's lending record are "process-oriented" criteria
such as whether the community delineation is reasonable, whether the bank's credit
extensions are consistent with the bank's capacity and the identified needs of the
community, and whether the bank's lending activity reflects a reasonable penetration into
all segments of the community. See CRA Q and A, supra note 10. The new CRA
regulations eliminate all the "process-oriented" criteria and focus only on a bank's loans,
investments, and services. See 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156 (1995). There is some skepticism,
however, that the regulators will abandon their focus on procedure. Jaret Seiberg, Draft
CRA Exam Guides Seen Failing To Cut Red Tape, AM. BANKER, Oct. 9, 1995, at 1.
43 See, e.g., Leonard Nakamura, Information Externalities: Why Lending May
Sometimes Need a Jump Start, 3 Bus. REV. 3 (Jan./Feb. 1993); Lawrence J. White, The
Community Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 281, 284-85 (1993).
"This view may be unduly optimistic. Some banks report, for example, lower loan
losses in their community reinvestment portfolios than in their regular portfolios. See
SQUIRES, supra note 11, at 263-64 (citing CALVIN BRADFORD, PARTNERSHIPS FOR
REINVESTING OF THE CHICAGO NEIGHBORHOOD LENDING PROGRAMS, 1990). Despite
this, low-income neighborhoods remain starved for credit. See Fishbein, supra note 5,
at 296. Although safe and sound, some loans to low-income areas may be more
expensive to make because they may be expensive to identify or administer. See
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means that the agencies are more concerned with banks' efforts to
ascertain community credit needs, establish CRA-related management
procedures, and advertise, than they are with banks' actual lending
records in low-income communities.45
The agencies do not require banks to meet any particular
credit need, but instead give them a large degree of discretion as to
which needs they will meet. Even if a community documents an
unmet credit need, a bank is allowed to decide not to meet it." For
example, a community might demonstrate a credit need for affordable
rental housing. Nevertheless, if a bank does not make commercial
real estate loans, it need not change its business to make such loans.47
While this may be consistent with the terms of the CRA, which does
not require a bank to make any particular type of loan, under the
current CRA enforcement regime, the agencies do not seem to do
enough to "encourage" banks to make these loans, as the CRA
requires. In fact, it appears that the Federal Reserve does not even
SQUIRES, supra note 11, at 28-30, 264. But see Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 319-
20 (arguing that "despite occasional profitable CRA loans, the general effect of the CRA
is to reduce depository institution safety and soundness"). However, a handful of small
community development banks, which 'specialize in making loans in low-income areas,
have been profitable and competitive with other banks. See Dean Foust & David
Greising, Banks that Believe in Many Towns Called Hope, Bus. WK., Nov. 30, 1992,
at 89; Elizabeth Leech, Investing in the Community, MAO. OF BANK MOMT., Aug. 1992,
at 33. See also Swire, supra note 19, at 354-55.
45 See,. e.g., Former OCC Official.: Some CRA Assessment Categories "More Equal
than Others," 6 FAIR HOUSING-FAIR LENDING No. 7, 7.2 (Jan. 1, 1991); Marsico,
supra note 11, at 195-255. Under the new CRA regulations, this will change, as the
only relevant factors will be lending, investment, and services. See 60 Fed. Reg.
22,156. Nevertheless, these new standards still do not require a bank to meet lending
targets, to make particular loans, or offer rate concessions. The standards for evaluating
CRA compliance remain highly subjective and may cause the agencies to continue to
focus on process. See Seiberg, supra note 42.
' Leonard Barman, et al., The Communily Reinvestment Act: A Preliminary
EmpiricalAnalysis, 45 HUSTINGS L.J. 383, 394 (1994); Andrew Miller, The New York
Proposal to Revise the Community Reinvestment Act: A Quantitative Step Towards
Objectivity and Effectiveness, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 951, 985 (1994).
"' See, e.g., Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 493, 496 n.20
(1991); C & S Sovran Corp., 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 779, 783 n.22 (1990); Citicorp, 68
Fed. Res. Bull. 499, 501 (1982). But see Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 317-18
(arguing that the CRA forces banks to enter lines of business or invest their assets in
ways inconsistent with their expertise and existing business). Under the new regulations,
this policy would not change.
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question whether a bank's decision to reject a loan is consistent with
the bank's business strategy, size, and financial condition, or
determine whether the bank has so much as considered making that
type of loan in response to ascertained community credit needs.48
Under the current CRA enforcement scheme, the regulatory
agencies have developed several criteria for evaluating bank lending
records,49 but the agencies have not established the relative weight of
each criterion or how to deal with a bank that satisfies some of the
criteria but not others."0 Nor have the agencies established numerical
standards for evaluating whether a bank satisfies these criteria. There
are no guidelines, for example, to determine whether the number and
dollar amount of a bank's loans in its community are sufficient to
meet the community's credit needs, whether differences in lending
levels between predominantly low-income or minority communities
and predominantly white or wealthy communities are too high, or
whether the higher rejection rates faced by minority loan applicants
are too high. This absence of numerical standards makes it difficult
for a community group to successfully question a bank's lending
record. While neither the CRA nor the HMDA permit the agencies
to establish credit quotas, an objective, non-binding guideline to
determine whether a bank's lending record is acceptable under the
CRA would not constitute a quota.5'
See, e.g., Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 77 Fed. Res. Bull. at 496 n.20.
9 These criteria include the bank's efforts to ascertain the credit needs of its
community and advertise its credit products, the extent of the bank's board of directors'
and upper management's participation in CRA efforts, evidence of discriminatory credit
practices, the geographic distribution of the bank's loans, the bank's definition of its
local lending community, the type and extent of a bank's lending within its lending
community, the bank's record of opening and closing branches, the bank's customer
services and deposit products, and the bank's participation in insured and community
development lending programs and projects. See 12 C.F.R. § 563e.7 (1994) (OTS); §
345.7 (1994) (FDIC); § 25.7 (1994) (OCC); and § 228.7 (1994) (Federal Reserve).
"0 See Fishbein, supra note 5, at 303; Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 326-27.
This will change under the new regulations, which describe how the bank's lending,
investment, and service record would be combined to determine the bank's overall CRA
rating. See 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156 (1995).
s See, e.g., Swire, supra note 19, at 352 (suggesting objective guidelines based on
relative performance of similar banks). The new CRA regulations do not contain
numerical standards. However, an earlier draft of the regulations contained a "market-
share" test for evaluating a large bank's lending record. See 58 Fed. Reg. 67,466
(1993). Under the "market share" approach, a bank's market share in low-income
292 [Vol. XI
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B. Strengthening Communities:
HMDA Data and CRA Challenges
1. HMDA Data
When Congress passed the HMDA, it envisioned that data
about home mortgage lending records would be used as a tool for
community groups to learn about and to fight redlining.52 The
HMDA's explicit purpose is to provide the public "with sufficient
information to . . . determine whether depository institutions are
fulfilling their obligations to serve the housing needs of the
communities and neighborhoods in which they are located." 53
Congress hoped that community residents and public officials would
use HMDA data to develop strategies to fight redlining and bring
money back into their communities.54 The HMDA data "will allow
people to have a 'Voice in what happens in their neighborhoods."
55
One witness who testified at Congressional hearings on the HMDA
summed up this attitude: "Community groups, armed with the facts,
can protect the integrity of their neighborhoods and their own vital
interests. "56
HMDA data have demonstrated lending disparities57 which
have, in turn, galvanized low-income communities to force banks to
increase their lending. 58 For example, the HMDA data from 1990-
1993 indicate that rejection rates for African-American home
neighborhoods would be compared to its share in wealthy neighborhoods. Id. The
"market share" test was eliminated in a subsequent draft CRA proposal as opponents
labeled it a credit quota. See 59 Fed. Reg. 51,235 (1994).
S2 121 CoNo. REc. 27,621, 34,453 (1975). See supra text accompanying notes 24-
26.
'3 12 U.S.C. § 2801(b) (1994). See also 121 CONG. REc. 25,160 (1975) ( noting
that depository institutions are required to establish a public record file to provide the
public with information to determine whether banks are giving reasonable service to the
community).
- H.R. REP. No. 561, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 20 (1975); S. R P. No. 187, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1975); 121 CONG. REC. 25,162, 34,455 (1975).
55 121 CONG. REc. 34,576 (1975).
* S. REP. No. 187, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975).
17 Glenn B. Canner & Dolores Smith, Expanded HMDA Data on Residential
Lending: One Year Later, 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 801, 801 (1992).
8 Id.
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mortgage applicants were more than twice as high as rates for
whites, 9 and the rejection rates for Latinos were nearly fifty percent
higher.6" -These disparities have resulted in a wave of negative
publicity about banks around the country, as newspapers and
community activists released study after study documenting
discriminatory rejection rates.61
Despite these dramatic racial disparities in lending rates, the
agencies have generally not been willing to use only disparities in the
HMDA data to investigate whether banks are discriminating.62 The
primary reasons are that HMDA data do not provide enough
information about the creditworthiness of a loan applicant, 63 do not
provide information about the adequacy of the loan collateral, and
underestimate the extent of a bank's lending in low-income
9 Id.
o See Jaret Seiberg, Bias Probes Seen Justified by Latest Home Loan Data, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 27, 1994, at -2; Glenn B. Canner et al., Residential Lending to Low-
Income and Minority Families. Evidence from the 1992 HMDA Data, 80 Fed. Res. Bull.
79 (1994); Canner & Smith, supra note 57 and accompanying text; Glenn B. Canner &
Dolores S. Smith, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act.- Expanded Data on Residential
Lending, 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 859 (1991). The rejection rates were as follows:
1990 1991 1992 1993
African-American 33.6% 37.6% 35.9% 34.0%
Latino 21.4% 26.6% 27.3% 25.1%
White 14.2% 17.3% 15.9% 15.0%
6.1 See, e.g., Theresa Carson, Las Vegas Groups Charge Redlining by Banks, AM.
BANKER, June 15, 1992, at 6; Richard Buck & Michele Matassa Flores, Blacks Get
Rejected More Often for Loans, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 22, 1991, at Al; Christopher
Dinsmore, Wachovia Rejects 27% of Black Loan Applicants, CHARLOTTE Bus. J., Oct.
21, 1991, at 1; Dee Gill, Texas Bank Fails to Mend its Record on Minority Loans,
Hous. CHRON., Sept. 15, 1992, at 1; Joanne Johnson and Brant Houston, Inequality
Seen in Approvals of Home-Loan Applications, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 21, 1993,
at Al; Thomas J. Leuck, RacialDifferences in Mortgage Lending, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
1992, at C1; Loan Figures Fall Among Economic, Racial Lines, AUSTIN Bus. J., Aug.
24, 1992, at 1; David R. Sands, D.C. Banks Said To Favor White-Area Investments,
WASH. TIMES, June 5, 1992, at Cl; Paulette Thomas, Blacks Can Face a Host of Trying
Conditions in Getting Mortgages, WALL' ST. J., Nov. 30, 1992, at 1; Paulette Thomas,
Federal Data Details Pervasive Racial Gap in Mortgage Lending, WALL ST. J., Mar.
31, 1992, at Al; Paulette Thomas, Minority-Area Lenders Faulted in ACORN Study,
WALL ST. J., June 5, 1992, at A2.
62 Meridian Bancorp., Inc., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 942, 947 (1992).
See Marsico, supra note 11, at 240 and accompanying text.
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communities because the HMDA data do not include consumer, small
business, or economic development loans.' As a result of the
regulators' indifference toward HMDA data, the Federal Reserve has
largely ignored demonstrated lending disparities in CRA challenges.6"
While this critique of the HMDA may be accurate, such disparities
should, at a minimum, raise a red flag and lead to further
investigation.66
2. CRA Challenges
Congress saw the opportunity to challenge a bank's
application on CRA grounds as essential to a "carrot and stick"
approach of encouraging banks to lend within inner city areas.67
Nevertheless, the agencies have emphasized the carrot over the stick,
and have rarely granted CRA challenges. 68 Between passage of the
6 Canner & Smith, supra note 57 and accompanying text.
65 See Marsico, supra note 11, at 240-41, n.398; Comerica, Inc., 79 Fed. Res. Bull.
31, 34-35 (1993); Meridian Bancorp, 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at 947; Banc One Corp., 78
Fed. Res. Bull. at 935-36; CoreStates Fin. Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 779, 783 (1992);
Banc One Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 699, 703 (1992); Comerica, Inc., 78 Fed. Res.
Bull. 554, 564-65 (1992); First of Am. Bank Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 371, 375 (1992);
BankAmerica Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 338; 355-56 (1992); First Bancshares of St.
Landry, Inc., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 136, 138 (1992); Chemical Banking Corp., 78 Fed.
Res. Bull. 74, 81-82 (1992); U.S. Bancorp, 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 1053, 1054-56 (1990);
AmSouth Bancorp, 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 957, 959 (1990); SouthTrust Corp., 76 Fed. Res.
Bull. 647, 648-49 (1990); Meridian Bancorp, Inc., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 51, .52 (1988);
First Midwest Bancorp, Inc., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 459, 460 (1987); National City Corp.,
68 Fed. Res. Bull. 427 (1982); Society. Corp., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 351, 353 (1980);
AmeriTrust Corp., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 238, 241 (1980).
The Justice Department has now taken the lead in using HMDA to investigate
bank lending records. Robert G. Boehmer, Mortgage Discrimination: Paperwork and
Prohibitions Prove Insufficient-Is it Time for Simplifications and Incentives, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 656 (1993). The Justice Department has sued three banks which
had significant HMDA disparities: Decatur Federal Savings and Loan in Atlanta,
Shawmut Bank in Boston, and Chevy Chase Federal Savings and Loan in Maryland.
Canner & Smith, supra note 57, at 817.
66 See, e.g., Banc One Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 932, 935-36 (1992).
67 123 CONG. REC. 17,630, 17,631 (1977). See supra text accompanying note 11.
6' Similarly, the regulatory agencies have given high scores to banks on the periodic
CRA assessments they conduct. See Marsico, supra note 11, at 239-41 and
accompanying text; see, e.g., Bank America Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at 355-56. In
the first two years after CRA ratings became public in 1990, only fourteen percent of
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CRA in 1977 and 1988, the regulatory agencies denied only eight out
of approximately 50,000 applications based on CRA grounds. 69 The
Federal Reserve did not deny an application based on CRA grounds
until 1989.70 In 1991 and 1992, eighty-five CRA challenges were
filed and only five were granted.7
Even though the threat of a successful challenge to a bank's
application is minimal, the application process and the threat of a
challenge offer community groups other sources of leverage in
negotiating CRA lending agreements. These include additional
expense for the bank, delay in approval of the deal, negative publicity
for the bank, and administrative hearings on the challenge.72 As a
result, threats to challenge and actual challenges have resulted in
commitments by banks to lend billions of dollars to low- and
all banks examined have received less than a satisfactory score, despite the evidence of
lending discrimination demonstrated by HMDA data. See SQUIRES, supra note 11, at
267. In 1994, 94% of banks received grades of satisfactory or higher. Shannon Henry,
AM. BANKER, Jan 26, 1995, at 10.
69 See MARSHALL, supra note 42, at 2; Fishbein, supra note 5, at 298 (stating that
eight out of 40,000 applications were denied based on CRA grounds).
"0 See Continental Bank Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 304, 305 (1989) (characterizing
bank's record of performance as "inadequate" while rejecting application). Since 1991,
however, the Federal Reserve has denied several applications on CRA grounds. See,
e.g., First Colonial Bankshares Corp., Fed. Res. Sys., May 18, 1993; Gore-Bronson
Bancorp., Inc., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 784, 787 (1992); First Interstate BaneSys. of
Montana, Inc., 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 1007, 1009 (1991). In addition, the Federal Reserve
issued its first two cease and desist orders against banks for CRA violations in 1991 and
1992. See Columbus Junction State Bank, Fed. Res. Sys., Doe. No. 92-076-WA/RB-
SM (1992); Farmers and Merchants Bank of Long Beach, Fed. Res. Sys., Doe. No. 91-
080-B-SM (1991).
"' Claudia Cummins, CRA Objections Blocked Only Three Filings Last Year, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 23, 1993, at 1.
7 See Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 322-23; CRA Slowing More Acquisitions,
7 BANK MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 1, 2-3, Oct. 1992; Theresa Carson, BankAmerica
Faces Ordeal: 145 to Testify, AM. BANKER, Jan. 14, 1992, at 11; Geoff Cooper, Merger
Between Associated, F & M Hits Fair Lending Project Roadblock, Bus. J. MILWAUKEE,
Dec. 23, 1991, at § 1, 6; Mike Dorning, Regulatory 'Delays' Kill Geneva Deal, Harris
Says, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 1991, at Bus. 3; Richard D. Hylton, Banks Are Prodded To
Offer Better Service in Poor Areas, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 7, 1990, at D1; Michael Quint,
Critics Gain Time To Fight Bank Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1991, at D7.
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moderate-income communities.73  If, however, the agency's
enforcement policies had been more strict, these commitments may
have been larger.
III. Using The CRA and HMDA to Help Create and Support
Community Development Financial Institutions
Although they promote economic community development and
community empowerment, the CRA and HMDA, because of internal
tensions and underenforcement, go only so far in fighting poverty.
While community groups have been able to use the CRA and HMDA
to gain billions of dollars in lending commitments,74 they cannot use
the CRA and HMDA to force banks to' meet all or even most
pressing community credit needs. Nevertheless, community groups
have discovered a way to sidestep the CRA's limitations and use it
more effectively to promote economic development and community
empowerment: by using the CRA and HMDA to support community
development financial institutions (CFDIs).75
A. Community Development Financial Institutions
The primary advantage of using the CRA to support CDFIs
is that, in contrast to traditional banks, CDFIs are consciously
designed to have the expertise, desire, and accountability necessary
to promote community-controlled economic development.76 As such,
" One estimate counts more than 300 such agreements totaling $18 billion in lending
to low- and moderate-income communities. SQUIRES, supra note 11, at 2. Another
estimate counts $30 billion in CRA commitments. Fishbein, supra note 5, at 294. For
descriptions of various provisions of CRA commitments, see Marsicu, supra note 11,
at 255-64.
74 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
75 See discussion infra parts III.A, III.B.
76 See SQUIRES, supra note 11, at 243. A comprehensive description of the
principles of community lending appears in Association for Enterprise Opportunity,
Center for Community Self-Help, Community Capital Bank, First Nations Development
Institute, National Association of Community Development Loan Funds, National
Federation of Community Development Credit Unions, and Woodstock Institute,
Principles of Community Development Lending & Proposals for Key Federal Support,
Jan. 25, 1993.
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they are more effective than banks in building the community's
economic infrastructure and eliminating poverty.
1. Expertise and Experience in Community Lending
Many different types of expertise are necessary to successfully
make loans in low-income communities. For example, making a loan
to purchase and rehabilitate a deteriorated building for the purpose of
creating affordable rental housing requires expertise in construction,
management, government subsidy programs,, and packaging multi-
party deals that involve developers, investors, grants, and, lenders.
77
The staff, volunteers, and board members of community development
financial institutions possess the necessary expertise to carry out these
loans.78
Expertise is also required to evaluate the creditworthiness of
low-income applicants for home mortgage loans. Many loan
applicants do not satisfy the requirements of the standard mortgages
offered by the banking industry.79 Any number of factors might
explain this, including low income, lack of credit history, an
intermittent employment record, more than one family member living
in a household, or high debt. Many of these obstacles can be
explained or solved, but not by a loan officer located in a central
office outside the community80 Rather, a person who lives in and
knows the community's culture is necessary.8"
A rapidly emerging and popular part of CRA agreements and
initiatives recognizes this need for expertise. Banks are funding
community groups to provide loan counseling for. community
residents to make the residents more creditworthy and to assist them
77 See SQUIRES, supra note 11, at 243, 265.
7 See Institute for Community Economics, The Community Loan Fund Manual 2-4,
2-16 (1987) [hereinafter Institute for Community Economics]; MARSHALL, supra note
42, at 160-61; Swire, supra note 19, at 354-55; Roland Diniz, Community Loan Funds
asa Development Tool, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 30, 1988, at 3.
79 See SQUIRES, supra note 11, at 264.
s Id.
81 See STEWART E. PERRY, COMMUNITIES ON THE WAY: REBUILDINO LOCAL
ECONOMIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 39-40 (1987).
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in filing bankable home mortgage applications." In connection with
these programs, and in consultation with community groups, banks
are changing their underwriting criteria to make them consistent with
safety and soundness and to make sure that they do not have a
discriminatory impact on minority or low-income home purchasers. 3
2. Desire To Make Loans in the Community
CDFIs consciously try to "reinvent" banking to ensure that
credit is available to meet all of a community's needs.." A successful
community development lender must invest more time and technical
assistance to make projects work, to take risks traditional lenders are
not willing to take, to develop strategies to ensure that such risks are
prudent, to earn less of a return, and to cut administrative costs
creatively.85
One important technique CDFIs have developed to ensure that
loans are safe and sound is to provide technical assistance and advice
to loan applicants both prior to making the loan and throughout the
8 See SQUIRES, supra note 11, at 142; Kenneth .Cline, NCNB, NAACP in Loan
Program; Bank to Fund Minority Financial Centers in Five Cities, AM. BANKER, Dec.
20, 1991, at 7; Timothy R. Dougherty, Closing the Gap: Stung by Charges of Bias
Against Minorities, Lenders are Trying To Do the Right Thing, NEWSDAY, Jan. 30,
1993, at 30; Leslie Wayne, New Hope in Inner Cities. Banks'Offering Mortgages, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 1992, at Al.
s See SQUIRES, supra note 11, at 16, 247; Fishbein, supra note 5, at 299; J. Linn
Allen, Banks, Activists Tailor Loans to Communities, CHL TRB., Sept. 1, 1992, at 1;
Jeff Brown, Philadelphia Leads in Lending to Minorities, PHIL. INQUIRER, June 5, 1992,
at Al; Steve Klinkerman, Community Relations: Banks Cautiously Expand Credit
Counseling Efforts, AM. BANKER, Jan. 27, 1992, at 5. Examples include allowing
applicants with no credit history to show a good history of paying rent or utility bills,
considering regular employment as opposed to consecutive years employed at the same
job, and counting household income from all sources, including public assistance. See
Marsico, supra note 11, at 216-17, 257-58.
Their mission seems consistent with Roberto Unger's notion of creating an
"alternative institutional definition of the market." See ROBERTO UNGER, FALSE
NECESSITY, ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL
DEMOCRACY, PART I OF POLITICS, A WORK IN CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIAL THEORY 480
(1987).
S See MARSHALL, supra note 42, at 105-08.
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life of the loan.86 CDFIs spend the majority of their time assessing
the creditworthiness of a project, 7 pointing out potential problems,
developing sound financial plans, identifying other sources of capital,
securing other providers of technical assistance such as architects and
engineers, and providing assistance if the borrower is having
difficulties paying the loan.88
CDFIs make loans that traditional banks are not willing to
make.89 One type of CDFI, a community development loan fund,
makes loans to non-traditional development projects and organizations
to which banks are generally unwilling to lend.9" These projects
include community land trusts and" mutual housing associations, 9'
low-income tenant associations seeking to purchase their buildings,
non-profit organizations seeking to develop affordable housing,92
community development corporations seeking to start businesses or
economic stimulus projects, and consumer cooperatives.9 3 They are
also willing to make unsecured loans or. accept a third or fourth
mortgage. 94
86 See SQUIRES, supra note 11, at 263; MARSHALL, supra note 42, at 161; Institute
for Community Economics, supra note 78, at 2-14, 2-16.
87 PERRY, supra note 81, at 40.
s See Institute for Community Economics, supra note 78, at 2-1; Diniz, supra note
78, at 3.
89 See SQUIRES, supra note 11, at 19.
' See Diniz, supra note 78, at 3; MARSHALL, supra note 42, at 160; Rachelle
Garbarine, A Loan Pool Helps Provide Affordables, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1992, at § 10,
p. 6. The National Association of Community Development Loan Funds was started in
1989 and had thirty-six members. Id. As of June 30, 1992, there were forty-one funds
with $60 million in loans to 1236 borrowers. Christine Dugas, Picking Up the Slack,
Credit Unions Take the Place of Banks for Poor and Even the Homeless, NEWSDAY,
Feb. 22, 1993, at 21.
91 These are non-profit entities that own land and lease it to tenants for long terms
at affordable rents. 'See, e.g., Institute for Community Economics, North Camden Land
Trust, COMMUNrITY ECONOMICS, Spring 1993, at 3; Provisions for CLTs, id. at 10.
92 MARSHALL, supra note 42, at 160.
" See Institute for Community Economics, supra note 78, at 1-7; Laura A. Kiernan,
Cash-Poor Look Past Traditional Banks, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 8, 1993, at 13 ($190,000
loan to association of mobile home owners as downpayment on land); see also
Garbarine, supra note 90, at 6 (describing one community loan fund which finances
projects such as construction).
' See Diniz, supra note 78, at 4.
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Although community development loan funds take risks that
banks will not,95 they must be prudent in making their loans. As a
result, they have developed new ways of ensuring safety. 96 Like
banks, community development loan funds obtain specific collateral
as a guarantee for their loans, accumulate permanent capital to cover
losses, and employ specialists to screen loans." Unlike banks, they
provide intensive technical assistance to ensure that borrowers are
creditworthy and are able to repay their loans.98 They also screen
borrowers for a shared commitment to the goals of the community
development loan fund, in the belief that this- common commitment
will create additional motivation to repay the loan.9 9 Finally,
community development loan funds limit the risk to any particular
investor by pooling investors' capital.' 0
Another example of a CDFI which is dedicated to taking non-
traditional risks is 4- micro-enterprise loan fund.' The vanguard
among these funds lend very small loans (as low as $500)"o2 for new
and start-up businesses that banks are generally unwilling to make
because most of these new business owners lack the traditional indicia
of creditworthiness.0 3 Micro-enterprise loan funds operate on the
principle that desire, hard work, training, moral support, technical
assistance, and peer pressure can create creditworthiness." ° They
generally operate revolving loan funds, in which new loans are made
931d. at 3.
Community development funds generally have a very low default rate. See
PERRY, supra note 81, at 154-55.
9 See Institute for Community Economics, supra note 78, at 2-14.
Diniz, supra note 78, at 4.
9 Id.
'99 Id. at 3.
101 MARSHALL, supra note 42, at 161-62.
'0 id. at 161.
,o3 See, e.g., Miriam Hill, Working for Herself; Group Helps Women Succeed in
Business, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 29, 1992, at iF (profling Women's Entrepreneurial
Growth Organization, which guarantees small loans for women entrepreneurs); Kiernan,
supra note 93, at 11 ($1500 start-up loan for sewing equipment); Abby Scher, Where
Credit Is Due, CITY LIMITS 6, Oct. 1991; Aaron Jaffe, MutualAid, CITY LIMrrs 8 (May
1992); David Wessel, Two Unusual Lenders Show How 'Bad Risks' Can Be Good
Business, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1993, at 1; Robert McNatt, A Kiss, a Grant, and
Maybe a Customer, CRAIN's N.Y. Bus., Sept. 7, 1992, at 3.
1o' See Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 344-45.
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as old ones are repaid.' 05 Borrowers are placed in small peer groups
with applicants who are to receive their loans out of the repaid
funds."0 6 In this context, applicants can place collegial pressure on
borrowers to repay their loans."0 7 Applicants also have a chance to
see first-hand the ups and downs of running a business.' 8 Together,
applicants and borrowers can share insights and ideas.1
0 9
Banks are also unwilling to risk opening branches in low-
income communities. " Another type of CDFI, a community
development credit union,"' meets this need. Community
development credit unions are, by definition, located in low-income
communities." 2 They make retail loans to people who do not bank
at a traditional bank for one of several reasons, including lack of a
nearby branch," 3 unaffordable fees, or high minimum deposit
requirements.ii 4  Community development credit unions have
traditionally made loans for consumer purchases, education, and
household needs."l5 Now they are branching into housing, home
improvement, and small business loans as well." 6
Since many CDFI borrowers cannot afford market rates,
CDFIs must find ways to make loans at lower rates when
necessary." 7 However, the technical assistance they provide to
'0' MARSHALL, supra note 42, at 161.
106 See Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 344-45 (describing "lending clubs" into
which members make contributions which are then loaned to the member voted to have
the best business plan); see also Kiernan, supra note 93, at 13 (describing lending clubs
as groups from which members obtain loans for which the group is collectively
responsible).
'07 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 344-45 (noting that "a variety of
nonlegal community sanctions" exist to pressure group members to repay loans).
108 Id.
109 Id.
11 MARSHALL, supra note 42, at 161; Wessel, supra note 103, at 1.
MARSHALL, supra note 42, at 88.
112 id. at 88-89.
113 id.
114 Kiernan, supra note 93, at 15.
"' See Institute for Community Economics, supra note 78, at 2-10 to 2-11; Surviving
in the City; Low-Income Credit Union Finds Key to Solvency, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 4,
1992, at ID.
116 Kiernan, supra note 93, at 14.
"1 See PERRY, supra note 81, at 153-54.
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borrowers raises the administrative costs of their loans. 118 Thus,
CDFIs must be willing to reduce expenses elsewhere.119
Most CDFIs are non-profit. 20 While they must still earn a
sufficient return on their loans to keep them viable, non-profit status
reduces the necessary rate of return."' Investors in CDFIs are
generally private individuals, church organizations, banks seeking to
satisfy their CRA obligations, and others who also may be willing to
accept a lower rate of return on their investments.1 22 Non-profit
status has another advantage: CDFIs can receive tax-deductible
donations of capital or operating expenses. 123 CDFIs are also willing
to reduce overhead through limiting expenses for travel, information-
gathering, or public relations, using donated facilities and equipment
and pro bono services, and paying modest salaries.124
3. AcCountability to the Community
CDFIs are designed to be accountable to the communities they
serve. 125 Meeting the needs of a particular community is the very
reason for the existence of most community development financial
institutions. 126  They are generally located in and managed by
residents of the communities they serve. 127 Community development
credit unions, for example, are cooperative organizations run by their
member depositors who must reside (with some exceptions) in
118 See SQuIREs, supra note 11, at 263; Institute for Community Economics, supra
note 78, at 2-16.
119 SQUIREs, supra note 11, at 263.
12 See PERRY, supra note 81, at 153-54.
121 Id.
122 See id.; Institute for Community Economics, supra note 78, at 2-1, 2-11;
Garbarine, supra note 90, at 6.
" See Institute for Community Economics, supra note 78, at 2-12.
124 id. at 2-16 to 2-17; MARSHALL, supra note 42, at 160-61.
12 See SQuIREs, supra note 11, at 269 (noting that reinvestment programs and
policies need to be tailored toward the communities they are designed to improve).
12 See Institute for Community Economics, supra note 78, at 1-1; Dugas, supra note
90, at 21.
127 Id. at 2-1; Diniz, supra note 78, at 3.
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the geographic area served by the credit union, and which make
loans to their members only.
1 21
B. The CRA's Support for Community Development
Financial Institutions
Community groups are increasingly realizing that under the
CRA, banks are encouraged to support community economic
development efforts of non-profit community groups that promote
economic development, including CFDIs.!29 Two of the criteria the
agencies currently use to evaluate a bank's CRA record indicate that
a bank can help satisfy its CRA obligations by supporting CDFIs:
the extent and type of credit a bank extends within its community and
the bank's participation in community development projects and
programs. 3 ' Loans or grants to CDFIs, which in turn can lend this
money to help meet community credit needs, satisfy both of these
criteria.13'
Two recent additions to one of the agencies' current joint
CRA policy statements also encourage banks to support CDFIs.1
2
The regulatory agencies made clear that banks can help satisfy their
CRA obligations through investments or loans to alternative lending
institutions such as CDFIs, even, if many of the loans made by the
CDFIs are not within the bank's lending community.133 In particular,
wholesale banks are encouraged to meet their CRA obligations by
making loans and grants to organizations like CDFIs."' Finally, it
has recently become clear that cash grants, free advice, or free
assistance to community organizations also help satisfy a bank's CRA
'28 Id. at 2-14; Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 313 n.79 (noting that credit
union's practice of loaning to members is likely sufficient community "investment" for
purposes of the CRA).
'2 See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text:
,30 See 12 C.F.R. §§ 228.7(i)(k) (Federal Reserve), 25.7(i)(k) (OCC), 345.7(i)(k)
(FDIC) and 563e.7(i)(k) (OTS) (1994).
131 See Marsico, supra note 11, at 213-15, 218-19, 225-26, 249-53.
132 These additions were made to the CRA Q and A on March 25, 1992. See 57
Fed. Reg. 10,899. The current version of the CRA Q and A was issued on February
19, 1993. See CRA Q and A, supra note 10.
,33 CRA Q and A, supra note 10.
134 id.
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obligations as long as the grants support an activity that would earn
CRA credit for a bank if the bank had made a loan to support the
project.135 Since a CDFI's lending would clearly earn a bank CRA
credit if the bank made the loan directly, grants and loans to CDFIs
would satisfy this standard.
Given this regulatory support for CDFIs, community groups
are increasingly using the CRA to encourage banks to support them,
and banks are more willing to do so. Many forms of support for
CDFIs and similar entities have developed, including loans,
investments, and grants. For example, banks have made loans to
non-profit organizations, community groups, community development
corporations, 36 churches, 37 small business lending programs,
1 3
micro-loan programs, 39 and loan pools which support affordable
housing, small business, or economic development."4 ' Banks have
135 See, e.g., Banc One Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at 935, 935 n.18; Old National
Bancorp, Inc., 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 55, 58-59 (1993); First Bank System, Inc., 78 Fed.
Res. Bull. 948, 951 (1993); U.S. Bancorp, 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 789, 792-93, n.27 (1993);
Comerica, Inc., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 554, 561 (1992); BankAmerica Corp., 78 Fed. Res.
Bull. 338, 350 n.67 (1992); NCNB Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 141, 154 (1992); NCNB
Corp., 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 119, 121 (1991).
136 BankAmerica Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at 351; NCNB Corp., 77 Fed. Res. Bull.
at 121 (1991); U.S. Bancorp, 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 1053, 1055 (1990); Muskingum Valley
Bancshares, 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 643, 645 (1990); CoreStates Financial Corp., 76 Fed.
Res. Bull. 176, 179 (1990); Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 761,
764, n.13 (1989); Mellon National Corp., 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 721, 723 (1983).
137 First of America Bank Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at 371 n.16; BankAmerica
Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at 351 n.74.
1' Meridian Bancorp, Inc., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 942, 946-47 (1992); CoreStates
Financial Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 779, 783 (1992); Comerica, Inc., 78 Fed. Res. Bull.
554, 562 (1992); BankAmerica Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at 351 n.75, 353; Chemical
Banking Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 78, 80 (1992); AmSouth Bancorp., 76 Fed. Res.
Bull. 957, 959 (1990); Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. at 764
n.13.
39 Meridian Bancorp, Inc., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at 946-47; The Shorebank Corp., 78
Fed. Res. Bull. 619, 620 n.3 (1992); First ofAmerica Bancorp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at
374; BankAmerica Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at,351.
140 CRA Q and A, supra note 10, at 10,904; Kenneth P. Fain & Sandra F.
Braunstein, Bank Holding Company Investments for Community Development, 77 Fed.
Res. Bull. 388, 392 (1991) [hereinafter Investments for Community Development];
CoreStates Financial Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at 782; Comerica, Inc., 78 Fed. Res.
Bull. at 561; BankAmerica Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at 352; NCNB Corp., 78 Fed. Res.
Bull. at 153, 155.
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also invested in community development activities.14 ' Two popular
investment vehicles are community development corporations 42 and
low-income housing tax credits.143  Other potential investment
vehicles are housing, employment, commercial, medical, and
educational projects that benefit low-income persons.
144
Finally, banks have made grants to community organizations
involved in local economic development.1 45 One popular example is
a grant to a community group to conduct a loan counseling program
to assist community residents in applying for loans. 14  "In kind"
grants, such as free advice through serving-on a board of directors or
loan review committee, developing loan applications or underwriting
standards, training staff or management, or providing accounting or
bookkeeping services, also help a bank satisfy its CRA obligations.
47
Two recent legal developments promise to make it even easier
for community-based organizations to use the CRA to create and
support CDFIs. First, in April 1995, the four federal bank
regulatory agencies adopted new CRA regulations under which loans,
investments, or grants to support CDFIs would count more toward a
bank's overall CRA rating than they do now. 41 Second, in August
1994, Congress passed the Community Development Banking and
Financial Institutions Act of 1994 (the "CDFI Act"), which created
',' investments for Community Development, supra note 140, at 389; First Financial
Corp., 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 671, 672 (1990); Illinois Neighborhood Development Corp.,
64 Fed. Res. Bull. 45 (1978).
"42 Banc One Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at 935 n.20; Luxemburg Baneshares, Inc.,
77 Fed. Res. Bull. 63 (1991); SouthTrust Corp., 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 647, 648 (1990);
Shorebank Corp., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 140, 141 (1988).
143 Banc One Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at 702 n.15; BankAmerica Corp., 78 Fed.
Res. Bull. at 350, 353; C & S Sovran Corp., 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 779, 782 (1990); First
Interstate Bancorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 881, 883 n.13 (1987).
'44 Investments for Community Development, supra note 140, at 389.
143 See SQUIRES, supra note 11, at 247; MARSHALL, supra note 42, at 161.
U.S. Bancorp, 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at 792; Comerica, Inc., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at
563; BankAmerica Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at 353 n.93; Chemical Banking Corp., 78
Fed. Res. Bull. at 82; Norwest Corp., 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 343, 345 n.13 (1991).
147 See CRA Q & A, supra note 10; NCNB Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at 148-57.
' 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156 (1995) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 228, 345, and
563e). For convenience, in describing the new regulations, this article will cite only the
new OCC regulations, 12 C.F.R. pt. .25.
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a $382 million fund to provide federal financial matching support for
CDFIs.' 49
Under the new CRA regulations, the amount, extent,
innovativeness, complexity, and responsiveness of a bank's
community development lending, investment, and services through an
intermediary such as a CDFI would be critically important factors in
assessing its CRA record. 150 For wholesale banks, the only measure
for evaluating CRA compliance would be the community development
test, which would evaluate a wholesale bank's record of making
community development loans, investments, and services, either
directly or indirectly, through an entity such as a CDFI. 5
Supporting CDFIs through loans, investments, and services would not
only earn CRA credit for retail and wholesale banks, it would
probably earn extra credit because such loans or investments would
be particularly complex, innovative, and responsive to community
needs. 152
The CDFI Act created a $382 million "Community
Development Financial Institutions Fund" (the "Fund") to provide
financial support in the form of matching loans, investments, grants,
and deposits to CDFIs. 53 The maximum amount any CDFI can
receive from the Fund is $5 million over any three year period." s
Assistance from the Fund must be matched dollar for dollar with non-
government sources.' 55 The Fund can provide financial assistance in
149 Pub. L. No. 103-324, tit. I, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994).
"S0 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.22(b)(4), 25.23(e), and 25.24. Community development lending
is one of four criteria under the "lending test," which would be the most important test
in determining a retail bank's CRA record. 12 C.F.R. § 25.22(b)(4). Community
development investment is a secondary basis for a retail bank's CRA rating. 12 C.F.R.
§ 25.23(e). Finally, community development services is one of the criteria under the
"services" test, another secondary basis for a retail bank's CRA rating. 12 C.F.R. §
25.24.
151 12 C.F.R. § 25.25(c).
152 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.22(b)(4), 25.23(e)(2), and 25.25(c)(2).
Pub. L. No. 103-324, §§ 102(B)(2) and 121(a), 108 Stat. 2160 (1994).
i Id. at § 108(D).
135 Id. at § 108(E). But see § 108(E)(2) (noting that exceptions to the dollar
matching requirement may be permitted by the fund in the case of an applicant with
severe constraints on available sources of matching funds).
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several forms, including equity investments, deposits, credit union
shares, loans, and grants."5 6
The CDFI Act defines a CDFI as an institution that: 1) has a
primary mission of promoting community development; 2) serves
either an economically distressed geographical area or a needy group
of individuals; 3) provides development services such as business
planning or financial and credit counseling in conjunction with
providing equity investment and loans; and 4) is accountable to
residents of its geographical area or to its target population. 15 7
The Fund will be a wholly owned government corporation
managed by a presidentially-appointed administrator.15 Applicants
for financial assistance must be CDFIs.5 9 Among the criteria the
Fund will consider when evaluating applications for assistance are the
extent of need and economic distress in the geographic area or
population to be served by the CDFI, the extent to which the
matching funds are from private sources, and the extent to which the
applicant is community-owned or governed. 6 ' The CDFI Act
requires the Fund to ensure that CDFIs receiving financial assistance
are financially sound.'
CDFIs can use funds received pursuant to the CDFI Act to
support the following: 1) commercial facilities that promote
revitalization, community stability, or job creation and retention; 2)
businesses that provide jobs, are used by or enhance the availability
of, products and services to low-income people; 3) community
facilities; 4) provision of basic financial services; and 5) housing that
is principally affordable to low-income people. 62
"6 Id. at § 108(a).
Id. at § 103(5)(A)(I-IV), 103(10), 103(20).
' Pub. L. No. 103-324, § 104(a)(2), 108 Stat. 2160 (1994).
"9 Id. at § 105(B).
60 Id. at § 107(A).
161 Id. at § 108(F).
162 Id. at § 108(B).
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IV. Conclusion
Community groups have used the. CRA to help eliminate
poverty by forcing banks to funnel billions of dollars in loans to low-
income communities. Nevertheless, due to limits in the scope of the
CRA and HMDA, the government's underenforcement of the laws,
and the dependency that this creates on outside institutions, this
approach to using the CRA and HMDA to fight poverty has
significant limits. One way that community groups have been
improving the effectiveness of the, CRA and HMDA as poverty-
fighting tools is by using them to strengthen CDFIs. Unlike banks,
these institutions are community-controlled institutions dedicated to
community economic development. If government support for CDFIs
continues to grow, this will facilitate efforts to develop CDFIs and go
a long way toward maximizing the potential of the CRA and HMDA
as tools to promote economic development and community
empowerment and to fight poverty.
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